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This paper stresses the importance of accounting for regional heterogeneity in 
the dynamic analysis of regional economic disparities. Studies of regional growth 
invariably presume regions are homogeneous in that their socio-demographic 
composition is assumed to be broadly similar. We argue that any analysis of regional 
convergence needs to be tested conditionally, i.e. conditional upon the socio-
demographic structure of the workers in the various regions.  To this end, we estimate 
various measures of conditional regional earnings inequality using Israeli regional 
data for the period 1991 – 2002. Our results show that much of the regional earnings 
inequality may be accounted for by the conditioning variables. Both in measures of 
regional convergence and regional mobility, conditioning makes a large difference to 
the results accounting for up to half the observed levels of inequality. Ignoring 
regional heterogeneity may therefore lead to serious over-estimation of the underlying 
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1. Introduction 
 
The empirical literature on regional growth convergence has implicitly 
assumed that the labor force is, on average, homogeneous between regions (Barro and 
Sala-I-Martin 1995, Tsionas 2000, Cuadrado-Roura et al 1999, Le Gallo and Ertur 
2003 among many others). Homogeneity does not mean here that individual workers 
are identical across regions since workers vary by age, education, ethnicity etc. 
Instead it means that individual heterogeneity tends to average out in large 
populations so that, for example, average age tends to be similar between regions. 
Regional homogeneity implies that wages in different regions should converge upon 
some common value. Suppose, however, that the labor force is in fact heterogeneous 
between regions in terms of its socio-demographic composition. Human capital theory 
does not predict in this case that real wages will be equated inter-regionally. Instead it 
predicts that real wages will tend to be higher in regions where there is a greater 
concentration of human capital, where workers have more experience, and where 
there are smaller concentrations of workers who typically earn less, mainly women, 
ethnic minorities and young workers. The growth convergence hypothesis must 
therefore be tested conditionally, i.e. conditional upon the socio-demographic 
structure of the workers in the various regions. 
Two recent studies (Duranton and Monastiriotis 2002 for the UK and Azzoni 
and Servo 2002 for Brazil) have broken new ground by conditioning upon workers' 
characteristics in testing hypotheses about regional convergence. They find that 
conditional regional inequality is smaller than its unconditional counterpart
1. They 
also attach importance to regional differences in the cost of living, which as noted by 
Beenstock and Felsenstein (2004), have also been typically ignored in the empirical 
literature, and which reduce measured regional inequality. A related paper is by 
Dumond, Hirsch and Macpherson (1999), who measure conditional regional wage 
                                                  
1  Dickie and Gerking (1987, 1998) conclude that US regional wage differentials in 1976 disappear 
after conditioning, and provincial wage differentials in Canada in 1988-9 are reduced by 40%. Maier 
and Weiss (1986) show that regional wage differentials in Austria persist even after conditioning on 
regional demographic characteristics. 
  3inequality in the US during 1985 – 1995 allowing for regional differences in living 
costs. However, they estimate average inequality over the period without investigating 
how conditional inequality has evolved over time. 
In summary, measures of regional inequality that take into account regional 
differences in socio-demographics as well as regional differences in living costs may 
be quite different to measures that ignore these differences. Also, tests of regional 
convergence that ignore these differences may generate quite different results to tests 
that condition upon these regional differences.        
In this paper we use data for Israel during 1991 – 2002 to estimate various 
measures of conditional regional wage inequality. We show that much of the regional 
inequality in earnings in Israel may be accounted for by the conditioning variables. 
Indeed, whereas there is regional sigma-divergence in unconditional wages, 
conditional wages display regional sigma stability. This evidence shows that ignoring 
regional heterogeneity may not only lead to serious over-estimation of the underlying 
level of regional inequality, but it may also lead to erroneous conclusions regarding its 
trend, or regional sigma convergence. We also show that while there is greater 
regional mobility in unconditional earnings, this conceals a low degree of inherent 
regional mobility. Our results show that up to half the mobility in regional earnings 
comes from socio-demographic characteristics. This serves to underscore the 
importance of conditioning for these attributes when looking at inequalities. 
Our results therefore join a small but growing body of evidence which 
suggests that regional heterogeneity matters. The law of large numbers, which 
predicts that regions are probably sufficiently large and diverse to be homogeneous, 
does not apply in Brazil, the United Kingdom, and even in small countries such as 
Austria and Israel. These results suggest that the widespread practice of testing for 
regional growth convergence without conditioning upon the socio-demographic and 
economic structure of the regions concerned is likely to be misleading. We also show 
that it is important to take account of cost-of-living differentials in the empirical 
analysis of regional convergence. 
 
 
  42 Regional Heterogeneity in Israel 
Portnov and Erell (2003) have shown that the social and demographic 
composition of Israel's regions is markedly heterogeneous. They surveyed 
regional distributions of a large body of diverse indicators finding spatial 
divergence over time in some (population, income distribution, labor force 
participation) and convergence in others (education, housing density etc). A cross-
sectional picture for wage earners highlighting select socio-demographic 
differences is presented in Table 1 for 1995. The data here come from the 
Household Income Survey (HIS) conducted annually by the Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS), covering roughly 13,000 respondents. Table1 shows that in 1995 
the average age of earners was 40.19 years in Haifa and only 35.04 years in the 
North (see Map1). Earners in Jerusalem had 14.16 school years, whereas earners 
in the North had on average only 11.31 years of schooling. Women accounted for 
53.3% of earners in Jerusalem, whereas they accounted for only 35.8% in the 
North. Almost half the workers in the North were non-Jewish whereas only 1% of 




Average monthly earnings varied substantially between the regions; there 
is a 40 percent difference between top-ranked Tel Aviv and bottom-ranked 
Northern region. Ostensibly, these are very large regional differences. However, 
they do not condition on the socio-demographic composition of the regions 
themselves. In this paper we examine whether these regional differences in 
earnings still persist after conditioning on the socio-demographics of the regions. 
 
3. Methodology 
 To estimate conditional differences in regional earnings we estimate 
"Mincer models" in which the labels i, r and t refer to the individual, the region in 
                                                  
2Arabs from East Jerusalem are excluded from the Household Income Survey.    
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Dri = 1 if individual i lives in region r and zero otherwise, and εit denotes the residual 
error with variance σ
2
t. In the absence of panel data for individuals, equation (1) is 
estimated for year t using survey data for that year. The estimate of δrt represents the 
conditional effect on earnings due to living in region r at time t. Note that in equation 
(1) the conditional trend in wages is expressed by αt, and the coefficients of the X 
variables may vary over time. We follow Azzoni and Servo (2002) and Maier and 
Weiss (1986) in assuming that the β's do not vary by region
3. Equation (1) implies 
that the expected value of earnings in region r at time t is: 
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Equation (2) shows that expected wage growth in region r derives from several 
sources. i) It varies directly with the change in α, which captures the national trend in 
wage growth, and ii) it varies directly with the national change in β, which captures 
the change in the returns to characteristics, such as an increase in the return to 
education. iii) Expected wage growth depends upon the regional change in these 
characteristics, e.g. the level of education in the region increases, and iv) it varies 
directly with the change in δr, which captures the change in return to living in region 
r. Finally, v) if the unexplained variance of earnings increases expected wage growth 
will be larger. In short, equation (2) may be used to decompose regional earnings 
growth into these 5 components. 
Having estimated equation (1) its parameters may be substituted into equation 
(2). Several applications of equation (2) are suggested. The first is to calculate the 
basic return to earning in region r in time t. It is equal to αt + δrt. We refer to this as 
the basic regional wage, which deducts from regional earnings growth components ii 
                                                  
3 Duranton and Monastiriotis (2002) allow the β's to vary by region. 
  6and iii. The second is the conditional regional wage, which is equal to αt + δrt + X0βt, 
where X0 denotes average regional characteristics in the base year. The conditional 
regional wage normalizes regional earnings to a common and constant socio-
demographic norm. It simulates the wage in region r at year t that would be expected 
had the socio-demographics of region r in year t been held constant at the average 
level in the base year. Conditional regional wage growth is therefore equal to basic 
regional wage growth plus wage growth due to the change in returns to 
characteristics. A further application is to decompose regional wage differentials in 
year t into contributions due to regional differences in the conditioning variables. In 
year t this is equal to (Xrt – Xt)βt.  
  Following Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) we may use the Mincer model to 
distinguish between within and between-group inequality in log earnings. Within-
group inequality is measured by the estimate of σ
2
t, whereas between-group 
inequality is measured by total inequality (the variance of lnWt) minus within-group 
inequality. Within-group inequality reflects the return to general ability, whereas 
between-group inequality reflects the return to observable socio-demographic 
characteristics such as education. Note that R
2 measures the share of between-group 
inequality in total inequality.   
We use the Household Income Survey (HIS) to estimate equation (1). 
Following Beenstock and Felsenstein (2004) we divide Israel into 9 regions that are 
illustrated on Map1.  Since the necessary regional data are only available since 1991 
we carry out the analysis for the years 1991 – 2002. The X variables include age and 
its square, years of schooling, 7 occupational dummies, 8 economic sectoral dummies, 
9 regional dummies, and dummies for marital status, Jews, males, and yeshiva 
students. The last variable (Berman 2000) refers to ultra-orthodox Jews whose years 
of learning are of little practical use. Hopefully, these variables capture a broad range 
of variables identified by labor economists in Israel. The base region is the Krayot, 
which is a group of towns near Haifa. 
Out of these controls only age, sex and religion are exogenous. In principle, 
individuals choose their occupation, where they work, marital status and their 
education. They also choose where they live therefore the regional dummy variables 
  7specified in equation (1) are potentially endogenous too. This means that separate 
instrumental variables are required for each of these potentially endogenous variables. 
For example, in the case of the regional dummies we would require variables which 
affect choice of residence without directly affecting earnings
4, and without directly 
affecting education and other potentially endogenous variables. Short of credible 
instruments, such as region of birth in the case of place of residence, and information 
on parents in the case of education, the issue of potential endogeneity in equation (1) 
cannot be convincingly treated. This means that the parameter estimates of equation 
(1) could be inconsistent, in which case conditional regional differences may be over 
or under-stated.  
The fact that place of residence is endogenous does not automatically mean 
that estimates of δr must be inconsistent.  If inhabitants in region r are 
positively/negatively self-selected then δr will be over/under - estimated. In this case 
δr embodies the causal effect upon earnings due to living in region r and a selection 
effect due to the people who happen to choose to live in region r. If, however, they are 
neutrally selected then δr will be consistent. Neutral selection occurs when unobserved 
heterogeneity in earnings (ε in equation (1)) is independent of unobserved 
heterogeneity in selection. We assume neutral selection by default. 
 
4. Mincer Models 1991 - 2002      
In Table 2 we report an illustrative estimate of equation (1) for 1995. Space 
prevents reporting the full set of estimates of equation (1) for each year. Nevertheless, 
in Table 3 we report estimates of some key β coefficients over time and measures of 
inequality. The former include age, sex, years of schooling, marital status, education 
level and ethnic/religious grouping. With the exception of ‘Non-Jew’ during 1991-7 
all covariates are statistically significant across the period and R
2 rises from 0.35 in 
1991 and peaks at 0.40 in 2001, suggesting the growing importance of between group 
inequality in total inequality. Overall earnings inequality has remained broadly 
                                                  
4 Duranton and Monastiriotis (2002, p 226) suggest occupation as such an instrument. However, 
occupation will tend to affect earnings. 
  8unchanged, but within-group inequality declined slightly and between-group 
inequality increased.  
Note that the coefficient on education (as measured by years of schooling) is 
conditional upon occupation, which in some years mediates most of the effect of 
education upon earnings. Table 3 indicates that this conditional return to education 
increased substantially in the second half of the 1990s. By contrast, the opposite 
happened to age; the age premium was lower in the second half of the decade. The 
gap between the earnings of Jews and Non-Jews widened by about 15% over the 
period, while the large wage advantage of males remained stable. Finally, the wage 
disadvantage of yeshiva graduates doubled over the period. 
Table 2 here 
Table 3 here 
In Table 4 we report the full set of δ coefficients, which index conditional 
relative regional earnings. The picture here is ostensibly more volatile than in Table 3 
with some regional coefficients switching direction of signs and levels of significance 
over the 12 year period
5. However, only 29 out of the 96 coefficients reported in 
Table 4 are statistically significant, of which Tel Aviv and the Center account for 15. 
These coefficients for Tel Aviv and the Center are consistently positive. The 
coefficients for the South are in the main negative over the period and but generally 
insignificant.  
The important conclusion arising out of Table 4 is that for the most part 
conditional regional wage differentials are zero. To investigate this matter more 
thoroughly we suggest two separate statistical tests. In the first, we re-estimate the 
Mincer model for year t with zero restrictions on regional dummy variables (δrt = 0 
given t), and use an F-test to retain the regional dummy coefficients that are 
statistically significant. In the second, we use the results presented in Table 4 to test 
the restriction that the dummy variables for a given region are not significantly 
different from zero over time (δrt  = 0 given r). We use the inverse chi-square meta-
statistic (Hedges and Olkin 1985): 
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where Prt denotes the p-value of estimated δrt. If Ar exceeds the critical value of chi-
square then we may reject the hypothesis that δrt  = 0 in region r. We report these meta 
statistics in Table 4, which show that only in Tel Aviv, the Center and the South are 
these regional dummy variables systematically significant. 
In Table 5 we report the estimates of these regional dummy variable 
coefficients that survive the F- tests mentioned above. In Tel Aviv earnings are 
between 9 to 18 percent higher than in the base regions, while in the South they are 
about 3 to 12 percent lower.   
Table 4 here 
Table 5 here 
 
 
5. Conditional Regional Inequality 
In Figure 1 we compare conditional and unconditional real wages. The 
difference between them reflects two quite separate phenomena, the effect of the 
regional dummies (δrt) and the effect of the regional characteristics. Since the Krayot 
serve as the base region, the conditional and unconditional earnings in the base year 
(1991) are necessarily the same. Subsequently the conditional earnings in the Krayot 
exceeded their unconditional counterparts because the conditioning variables in the 
Krayot changed adversely, i.e. to lower earnings. In the North and South conditional 
earnings systematically exceed unconditional earnings for two reasons. First, δ tends 
to be negative for these regions (Table 5) and, second, the characteristics are adverse. 
However, these effects lessen and the gap narrows. In other regions, such as Haifa and 
the Center, the opposite occurs, while in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Dan, the difference 
between conditional and unconditional earnings tends to be small. 
Figure 1 here 
In Figure 2 we plot the data for conditional earnings presented in Figure 1 
deflated by regional cost of living (COL) indices. These COLs reflect  regional 
differences in house price, services  and goods (Beenstock and Felsenstein 2004).   
  10Whereas in Figure 1 Tel Aviv has the highest conditional earnings, in Figure 2 Tel 
Aviv does considerably less well because of its high cost of living. In contrast, the 
South is well-placed in Figure 2 and poorly placed in Figure 1 because of its low cost 
of living.  
Figure 2 here 
The conditional and unconditional inter-regional Gini coefficients for COL 
adjusted earnings are plotted in Figure 3. The unconditional Gini coefficient rises over 
time indicating Gini divergence in regional wages. By contrast, the conditional Gini 
coefficient remains stable over time and is persistently smaller than its unconditional 
counterpart. By 2000 unconditional Gini is almost twice its conditional counterpart, 
but the gap narrowed subsequently. The gap between the two reflects the contribution 
of regional characteristics to regional inequality. What remains is the regional 
inequality that is independent of these characteristics, i.e. the contribution of the 
regional dummy effects (δrt) and regional differences in COLs. Had δrt been zero and 
COLs been the same across regions, the Gini of conditional COL adjusted earnings 
would have been zero.  
Figure 3 here 
 
6. Regional Mobility 
As in Beenstock and Felsenstein (2004) we distinguish between rank and quantity 
mobility (sometimes referred to as relative and absolute mobility). The former focuses 
on changes in the rank of region r in the distribution, while the latter focuses upon the 
level of earnings. These two types of mobility may or may not move in tandem. A 
region's earnings may increase relative to the national average, in which case earnings 
are upwardly mobile in quantity, while at the same time the region's rank in the 
distribution falls, in which case there is downward mobility in rank.  
Since we use Gini as a measure of inequality, and we wish to relate mobility to 














  11where Rrt = F(Yrt) is the rank of Yrt over n in ascending order
6.  
Following Schechtman and Yitzhaki (1987) Gini may be defined as: 
) 4 (
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where Gt is the Gini coefficient measuring inequality in Y between n regions at time t. 
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and is bounded between 1 and –1. It measures the degree of (backward) rank-
mobility. Y is perfectly rank-immobile when Γ = 1. If Γ = 0 there is random rank-
mobility because it is not possible to infer Rrt-1 using information on Yrt. For all 
practical purposes this represents the case of complete mobility. When Γ = -1 there is 
perfectly perverse mobility: the richest swaps rank with the poorest, the second most 
rich with the second most poor, and so on. 
  Substituting equations (4) and (5) into (3) gives rise to the following 
decomposition theorem for beta: 














Equation (6) shows that beta, which measures quantity-immobility, depends upon 
three factors. It varies directly with the degree of (backward) rank-immobility (Γt.t-1). 
It also varies inversely with the degree of Gini divergence as measured by Gt/Gt-1. 
Finally it varies directly with the rate of leveling-up as measured by  1 / − t t Y Y , which 
exceeds unity in the event of leveling-up and is less than unity in the event of leveling 
down. If all three components happen to equal unity, then β = 1 and the rate of mean 
reversion is zero. When Gt = Gt-1 and  1 − = t t Y Y , equation (6) implies that β = Γ, i.e. 
rank-mobility and quantity-mobility are identical. In general, however, the two 
measures of mobility differ. Indeed, beta may exceed unity when gamma is less than 
unity and vice-versa. If Γ = 0 then β = 0 regardless of the rates of Gini convergence 
                                                  
6 OLS uses Yrt-1 instead of Rrt-1. Since the rank of Y is measured better than Y itself, the Gini estimator 
may be regarded as an EV (errors-in-variables) estimator. 
  12and leveling. Equation (6) implies that one cannot infer Gini convergence or 
divergence from beta convergence or divergence, and vice-versa.  
Note that in general Γt.t-1 differs from Γt-1.t, i.e. backward and forward 
measures of rank - mobility differ, unless Yrt-1 and Yrt happen to be exchangeable
7. 
The problem is similar to the common index number effect, where for example, the 
rate of inflation depends upon the direction of measurement. Yitzhaki and Wodon 
(2004) have suggested a symmetric Gini mobility index, which weights the forward 
and backward measures of mobility, defined as: 
) 7 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
1
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S is naturally bounded between 0 (no mobility) and 2 (perfectly perverse mobility). 
When S = 1 mobility is random. Note that if Yit and Yit-1 are exchangeable Γt-1.t = Γt.t-1  
= Γt in which case St = 1 - Γt. Note also that this measure of mobility does not require 
arbitrary definitions of mobility matrices in which intra-decile mobility is given zero 
weight.  
  In Figure 4 we plot Gini mobility indices for conditional and unconditional 
COL adjusted regional earnings. In the former case mobility is induced by two 
phenomena, the change in the regional dummies (Table 5) and the change in regional 
COLs. In the latter case it is additionally induced by changes in regional 
characteristics. Conditional mobility measures the underlying mobility. Had regional 
COLs and dummies remained unchanged conditional mobility is zero by definition, 
but unconditional mobility may have been positive because of changes in regional 
characteristics. In our opinion the difference between these two measures of mobility 
is insightful. 
 We begin by calculating Gini mobility between 1991 and 1992, and thereafter 
calculate cumulative Gini mobility indices. Had regional characteristics been frozen at 
their base-year (1991) level the two schedules in Figure 4 would have been identical 
by construction. The fact that there is more Gini mobility in unconditional earnings 
indicates that changes in regional socio-demographics on the whole induced greater 
mobility. It should be noted, however, that changes in regional socio-demographics 
                                                  
7 Exchangeability means that the shapes of the marginal distributions of Yt and Yt-1 are similar.  
  13can induce lower mobility, as was the case during 1991 – 4. The apparently high 
degree of mobility in unconditional earnings in fact concealed a low degree of 
inherent (conditional) regional mobility. In fact, as much as half of the mobility in 
regional earnings is due to changing socio-demographics. This further emphasizes the 
importance of controlling for regional characteristics in measuring the dynamics of 
regional inequality.   
Figure 4 here 
 
  Finally, we compare conditional and unconditional quantity mobility in 
regional COL adjusted earnings. Figure 5 compares beta, or the mean reversion 
coefficient, for conditional and unconditional earnings cumulatively. One might think 
that as in Figure 4, where rank mobility increases cumulatively, the same would apply 
to quantity mobility. However, Figure 5 shows that this does not apply to quantity 
mobility as measured by beta. Indeed, this is true for both types of earnings, 
conditional and unconditional. This shows that it is important to distinguish between 
the two types of mobility. Also, according to Figure 4 unconditional earnings are 
more rank-mobile that conditional earnings. Precisely the opposite applies to quantity-
mobility in Figure 5, where beta for unconditional earnings is systematically larger 
than its counterpart for conditional earnings. Beta for conditional earnings is roughly 
half its counterpart for unconditional earnings, indicating a moderate degree of 
quantity-mobility. By contrast, unconditional earnings indicate that there is little 
quantity mobility in regional earnings, although as shown in Figure 4 there is some 
degree of rank mobility. Beta for unconditional earnings ranges between 0.3 and 0.9 
and is typically higher and more volatile than its conditional counterpart. Figure 5 
shows that conditional earnings are more immobile in quantity than unconditional 
earnings. This finding parallels that of Figure 4 where conditional earnings were more 
immobile in rank. Once again we see that accounting for regional characteristics can 
substantially change conclusions about the degree of mobility and inequality. 
  Note that cumulative beta can change quite sharply from one year to the next. 
For example, unconditional beta for 1991-5 is only half its counterpart for 1991-4. 
This in itself does not imply anything about beta-mobility between 1994-5. The 
  14reason for this is that one cannot infer cumulative correlations from correlations 
between consecutive years without additional information on the partial correlations 
between these consecutive years. This logic also lies behind the sharp increase in 
cumulative beta between 1991 – 2000.   
 




This paper joins a growing literature that stresses the importance of accounting 
for regional heterogeneity in the dynamic analysis of regional economic disparities. In 
the standard literature, regions are assumed to be homogeneous in that their socio-
demographic composition is assumed to be broadly similar. It might be taken for 
granted that the law of large numbers implies that regions might be expected to be 
broadly homogeneous. However, we have shown that in Israel there is a substantial 
degree of regional socio-demographic heterogeneity.  
We have shown that this regional heterogeneity accounts for a large 
component of regional wage differentials. Similar findings have been reported for the 
UK (Duranton and Monastiriotis 2002), and Brazil (Azzoni and Servo 2002), which 
suggests that regional heterogeneity is important in large countries as well as small 
ones such as Israel. Controlling for socio-demographic diversity radically reduces 
measures of regional inequality, which implies that most of observed regional 
inequality is not inherent, but is due to regional diversity. For example, if workers in a 
region happen to be young and less educated, or if there is a predominance of 
subpopulations with poor pay, earnings will be lower, not because of regional factors, 
but due to these characteristics.    
  The regional convergence literature has typically ignored socio-demographic 
heterogeneity. We argue in this paper that tests for regional convergence should be 
carried out by conditioning upon socio-demographic attributes of the regions. In this, 
our proposal has much in common with conditional convergence in the international 
growth convergence literature. Our results show that conditional earnings Gini-
  15converge by more than do unconditional earnings across regions. This shows that tests 
for convergence are sensitive to conditioning. Whereas Duranton and Monastiriotis 
(2002) investigated convergence in the individual returns to attributes, such as 
education, we have broken new ground by using our model to test for convergence by 
conditioning jointly upon all of these attributes. In doing so we have taken account of 
regional cost-of-living differentials, to which economic geographers and regional 
scientists attach growing importance.    
  Apart from focusing upon Gini-convergence we have also investigated the 
effects of conditioning on beta convergence. Here too we find that conditioning serves 
to alter the results. We draw attention to differentiating between beta convergence, 
which measures quantity or absolute mobility, and measures of mobility that stress 
rank or relative mobility. We use the recently developed Gini mobility index to 
measure rank mobility both conditionally and unconditionally. Here too we find that 
conditioning makes a large difference to the results; conditional Gini mobility turns 
out to be only half its unconditional counterpart. Interestingly, it turns out that the two 
measures of mobility, rank and quantity, behave quite differently. First, there is more 
quantity mobility than rank mobility in conditional earnings. Secondly, the trend in 
rank mobility is positive, whereas there is no discernable trend in quantity mobility.  
We suggest that the distinction between the two concepts of mobility enrich the 
understanding of the dynamics of regional disparities.    
The results further suggest, that in the case of Israel a dichotomous core-
periphery regional structure may more adequately describe regional dynamics than a 
more disaggregated structure (such as the 9-region classification used here). In 
contrast to findings from larger countries where regional dummies have a significant 
effect on earnings (for example, Duranton and Monastiriotis 2002) in our case, the 
only regions to report consistently significant effects over the whole period are the 
core regions (Tel Aviv and the Central region). This suggests that once we control for 
socio-demographic heterogeneity, Israel is primarily a 2-region country and that all 
other regional subdivisions outside this core-periphery structure are not really 
relevant. We do not know whether this dichotomy stems from the smallness of Israel 
  16or whether the same would apply intra-regionally in larger countries. After all, a 
typical region in the UK or Brazil is of similar size to Israel.  
However, once cost-of-living differentials are taken into consideration this 
core-periphery dichotomy is moderated. For example, Tel Aviv which leads the 
regional rankings in terms of unconditional earnings drops considerably after 
conditioning and COL adjustment. The latter largely reflects the high price of housing 
in Tel Aviv. Also, the peripheral North and South jump up the rankings, largely due to 
cheap housing there. 
Conditioning for socio-demographics reveals the bare bones of regional 
structure. We do not explain why conditional regional earnings differ. Amenity theory 
would explain them in terms of compensating differentials. If this were true, the high 
price of housing in Tel Aviv would reflect the regions’ concentration of amenities and 
the low price of housing in the North and South would reflect the dearth of amenities 
in these regions. The New Economic Geography offers a complementary 
interpretation, by stressing increasing returns to scale in production and consumption, 
and predicting that earnings will be higher in regions where scale is larger. Indeed, in 
the case of Israel earnings are higher in the center, where scale is higher, and lower in 
the periphery, where scale is lower.  
It seems to us therefore that regional earnings data are consistent with the New 
Economic Geography, and amenity theory explains why despite this, COL-adjusted 
earnings are higher in the periphery than in the center. The crucial equilibrating agent 
seems to be house prices.     
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JERUSALEM 36.67  14.16  1.06%  53.32%  4012  
North  35.04  11.31  49.05%  35.77%  3296  
Haifa  40.19  13.21  8.95%  47.59%  4207  
Sharon  37.55  12.48  13.29%  44.19%  4142  
Center  38.47  13.07  3.15%  48.69%  4448  
Tel Aviv  37.47  13.15  3.58%  48.79%  4633  
Dan  38.66  12.81  1.16%  48.39%  4112  
South  37.79  12.41  4.63%  47.74%  3734  
Average
1   37.67  12.73  11.98%  46.41%   
 
1. All variable averages are non-weighted and represent averages for the data set. 
2. Estimated on basis of wage equation in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Illustrative Wage Regression 
 
The earnings model is: 
lnYk (i,t) = α +  β1(i,t)AGEk + + β2(i,t)AGE
2
k + β3(i,t)EDUk + β4(i,t)NONJk +  
β5(i,t)MARk+ β6(i,t)MALEk+ β7(i,t)SCHOOLk+ β8(i,t)BR
*
k+ β9(i,t)OCC*k+ 
β10(i,t)REG*k+ εk (i,t) 
 
Where LnYk (i,t) = log earnings for individual k in region i in time t;   
•  AGE = age of earner between 25-65; 
•  EDU = years of schooling;  
•  NONJ is coded as unity for non-Jewish earners;  
•  MAR is coded as unity for married earners;  
•  MALE is coded as unity for male earners;  
•  SCHOOL is coded as unity if last place of education is a talmudic academy 
(Yeshiva);  
•  BR* represents a series of eight sector dummies that are coded as unity if the 
branch is agriculture (BR1), industry (BR2), electricity and water (BR3), 
construction (BR4), commerce restaurants and hotels (BR5), transport and 
communications (BR6), finance and business services (BR7), public and 
community services (BR8);  
•  OCC* represents a series of seven sector dummies that are coded as unity if 
the occupation is scientific and academic professional (OCC1), other 
professionals and technicians (OCC2), managers (OCC3), clerks (OCC4), 
sales and service agents (OCC5), farm workers (OCC6), skilled industrial 
workers (OCC7), 
•  REG* represents a series of regional dummies that are coded as unity if the 
region is Jerusalem (REG1), Tel Aviv (REG2), Haifa (REG3), Dan (REG4), 
Center (REG5), South (REG6), Sharon (REG7), North (REG8). 
 
The estimated equation for 1995 is: 
Ln(earnings) = 5.025 + 0.074Age – 0.00076 Agesquare + 0.0694 Years schooling – 
0.0641 Non-Jew + 0.5527 Male + 0.1846Married – 0.9729Ultra-Orthodox 
+ 0.088Jerusalem +0.1983 Tel Aviv + 0.412 Haifa + 0.1241Dan + 
0.1446Center – 0.0422South + 0.08491Sharon + 0.0555North 
 
Source:  Household Incomes Survey 1995, Central Bureau of Statistics.  





1991                        1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Education   0.019












































Marital Status  0.086


































































inequality  0.381                        0.414 0.402 0.416 0.388 0.405 0.401 0.390 0.396 0.394 0.388 0.420
Between Group 
Inequality  0.207                        0.229 0.224 0.243 0.240 0.248 0.233 0.233 0.257 0.263 0.266 0.239
R
2                          0.351 0.354 0.358 0.368 0.381 0.378 0.365 0.372 0.391 0.399 0.405 0.362
 
*  Significant <  0.001 
 
  22Table 4: Regional Coefficients over Time 
 
Regions  Meta 
Statistics 
1991                        1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Jerusalem   24.94  -0.114
*  0.062
  -0.030                    -0.107 0.042 -0.002 0.044 -0.018 0.053 0.035 -0.042 -0.039
(0.053) (0.057) (0.055) (0.054) (0.050) (0.051) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
Tel Aviv  89.94
**                        0.008 0.203








(0.050) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052) (0.048) (0.049) (0.036) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
Haifa                          15.67 -0.104 0.129
* -0.032 -0.034 0.026 -0.039 0.062 -0.015 0.002 0.058 -0.005 -0.100
* 
(0.054) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.051) (0.057) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.054) (0.038) (0.038)
Dan                          20.01 -0.038 0.089 0.017 -0.001 0.076 -0.015 0.087
*  -0.012 0.087
* 0.058 0.042 0.033
(0.049) (0.052) (0.050) (0.051) (0.047) (0.046) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
Center                        69.24
** 0.014 0.201







(0.047) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.046) (0.045) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
South                        45.91
* -0.108
* 0.082
  -0.066 -0.104
* 0.026 -0.086 0.007 -0.102
* -0.035 -0.042 -0.041 -0.071
* 
(0.051) (0.058) (0.052) (0.051) (0.048) (0.047) (0.035) (0.034) (0.037) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035)
Sharon                            29.11 -0.144
* 0.078 -0.073 0.010 0.086 -0.145
* -0.023 -0.022 0.025 0.007 -0.025 0.019
(0.060) (0.062) (0.062) (0.064) (0.058) (0.058) (0.046) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.043)
North                            28.27 -0.043 0.025 -0.083 -0.115
* 0.066 -0.073 0.014 -0.069
* 0.009 0.003 -0.006 -0.064
(0.051) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052) (0.063) (0.047) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
R
2                          0.351 0.354 0.358 0.368 0.381 0.378 0.365 0.372 0.391 0.399 0.405 0.362
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
 
Standard figures in parentheses. 
*  Significiant < 0.05 
 








                          1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Jerusalem    -0.106     -0.124          0.058      -0.063 
Tel-Aviv     0.129    0.096    0.110                0.073 0.127 0.092 0.151 0.183 0.173 0.093
Haifa -0.094                      -0.125 
Dan              0.066     0.093      0.060 0.065  
Center    0.129    0.089    0.074     0.100            0.074 0.123 0.117 0.123 0.071
South    -0.099   -0.036    -0.121   -0.087    -0.089        -0.096 
Sharon    -0.134         -0.144    -0.056         
North         -0.130    -0.071            -0.088 
Krayot                         
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Figure 4: Conditional and Unconditional Cumulative Gini mobility Indices 
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Map 1: Geographic Regions of Israel 
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